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UFR de philosophie, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, and IHPST (Institut d’histoire et de philosophie des 
sciences et des techniques), Paris 
 
1. Overview 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide an account of causation that is compatible with both 
common sense intuition and science. In the next section, I briefly rehearse the most important 
philosophical strategies for analysing the concept of causation. Then I investigate, in the third 
section, criteria of correctness for a philosophical theory of causation. In the fourth section, I 
review some important counterexamples to the traditional accounts mentioned in the second 
section, and suggest, in the fifth, that these counterexamples can be seen as grounded on two 
kinds of intuitions. The sixth section presents results of the linguistic analysis of common sense 
causal statements. In the seventh section, I offer an analysis of causality in agreement with the 
criteria elaborated in the third section: Relations of causal responsibility make true causal 
statements of one type identified in the sixth section, and underlie the intuitions such statements 
express. Such relations contain as a part another, simpler relation: the causal relation between 
events, which makes true statements of the other sort identified in the sixth section. The eighth 
section answers two important objections, one against the thesis that facts can be causes, the other 
against the thesis that events can be causes
1
.  
 
                                                
1
 In (2002), (2006a), and (2011), I present a more detailed overview of the most important contemporary analyses of 
causation than I can give here in section 2. These earlier presentations also contain additional counterexamples 
against these theories.  Much of the material presented in section 6 has appeared in my (1999) and (2006). (2006) 
and (2006a) offer a similar sorting of intuitions in two kinds as section 5 below, as well as a proposal, similar to the 
one I put forward in section 7, to account for these intuitions in a unified framework using the notion of a truthmaker. 
I had already addressed the challenge raised by negative states of affairs in (2001), (2006), and (2006a). However, 
the present paper improves the overall coherence of the unified theory of causation I offer by giving more weight to 
the methodological considerations presented in section 3, and to the notion of a truth-maker. This allows me in 
particular to improve the answer I had given in those earlier works to the challenge raised by negative states of 
affairs. 
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2. Some important proposals for analysing causation  
 
The debate on the nature of causation is almost as old as philosophy itself. In the 
Aristotelian paradigm, which was prevalent up to the 17
th
 century, providing a scientific 
explanation of some natural phenomenon was the same thing as finding its cause. In modern 
philosophy, causal explanation has been assimilated to explanation in terms of laws of nature. 
The doctrine of logical empiricism that has dominated a large part of philosophy of science in the 
20
th
 century, has spelled out this idea in the “deductive-nomological” (DN) conception of 
causation and explanation. Although it has been subject to much criticism since the 1960s, it 
remains one of the major approaches to the analysis of causation. According to the DN approach, 
one event a is the cause of another event b, if and only if there is a law of nature (or a set of such 
laws), such that a description of the effect-event can be logically deduced from a description of 
the cause-event, together with a statement of the relevant laws. The so-called initial conditions, 
which figure – together with one or more laws of nature - in the premises of such an argument, 
describe the cause, whereas the conclusion of the argument describes its effect. The DN approach 
is intended to be both an analysis of causation and of scientific explanation, making it a 
conceptual truth that all scientific explanations are causal explanations. It accounts for 
deterministic as well as for indeterministic causal processes. This distinction corresponds to the 
difference between deterministic and indeterministic laws: According to the nature of the laws 
figuring in the premises of a DN explanation, the causal relation is deterministic or 
indeterministic. However, as we will see, it is now widely agreed that not all scientific 
explanations are causal. Thus, even if the DN account provides an adequate analysis of 
explanation, it is no adequate analysis of causation. 
A major alternative to the DN account is the probabilistic approach, which is built on the 
observation that causes typically raise the probability of their effects. That high emission rates of 
carbon dioxide cause global warming, implies that, all other factors being supposed constant, 
high emission rates make strong global warming more probable. It may seem just as plausible to 
reason in the opposite direction, from higher probability to the existence of a causal relation. The 
adequacy of the probabilistic approach depends among other things on how the terms of the 
causal relation are construed. Being based on conditional probabilities between factors, or types 
of events, it has first been elaborated as a theory of causal relations between factors or types of 
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events, although some authors have then extended it to cover also causal relations between 
particular events
2
.  
In David Hume’s analysis of causation, causal judgments are based on the experience of 
regularities. This idea can be seen as one variant of the nomological approach, insofar as laws 
themselves are often considered, in the empiricist tradition, as nothing more than a subset of 
regularities (or statements of such regularities). But Hume also mentions an idea that David 
Lewis (1986) has recently developed to become another of the main alternatives to the DN 
approach. According to the counterfactual approach, causal relations are analysed in terms of 
counterfactual dependence. Event c causes event e if and only if there is a chain of intermediate 
events c, c1, c2, …, e, so that each event in the chain depends counterfactually on its predecessor. 
If ci and ci+1 are events that have occurred, event ci+1 counterfactually depends on event ci if and 
only if it is the case that if ci had not occurred, ci+1 would not have occurred. To say that the 
emission of CO2 by human activity causes global warming is equivalent to saying that if there 
had been no (or less) CO2 emission due to human activity, there would have been no (or less) 
global warming
3
. 
One variant of the counterfactual approach has recently gained particularly widespread 
interest and adhesion. As the probabilistic approach, it is tuned to analyze causal relations among 
types of events, rather than particular events. According to the interventionist approach
4
, a 
variable A representing one type of event is a cause of a variable B representing another type of 
event if and only if an agent could in principle (abstracting away from practical limitations) 
modify the value of B by manipulating the value of A, while other variables influencing B are 
held constant. Von Wright (1971) has shown that the fact that manipulability is our main 
epistemic criterion for obtaining knowledge of causal relations, is insufficient for establishing that 
manipulability is the ontological ground of causation. However, Woodward (2003) and others 
have recently reformulated interventionism as a metaphysical theory of causation
5
. Woodward 
uses mathematical models and methods that have been elaborated in statistics and artificial 
intelligence to define different causal notions, such as direct cause or contributing cause, 
                                                
2
 See Eells (1991). 
3
 Dowty (1979) has made Lewis’ counterfactual analysis of causation influential in linguistics. 
4
 It is also often called “manipulationist” approach. 
5
 Arguably, Woodward’s theory pursues the aim of providing “the metaphysical basis of causal explanation” 
(Strevens 2007, p. 244) although Woodwards himself denies that his (2003) “is a metaphysical treatise” (Woodward 
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relatively to a set of variables. Recent versions of interventionism escape the charge of restricting 
the domain of applicability of the notion of causation to the range of influence of human action, 
by defining an intervention on a variable in purely probabilistic terms.  
Finally
6
, it has been proposed to analyse causation in terms of some material process 
stretching from the cause to the effect event. Processes of different kinds have been suggested as 
grounding causation; for some, it is the propagation of energy
7
, for others, an amount of a 
conserved quantity
8
, for still others, a process capable of transmitting a mark, i.e. of transmitting 
information
9
.  
 
3. Criteria of adequacy and two types of philosophical theories of causation  
 
Faced with such a plethora of approaches, it seems well advised to step back and ask for 
the criteria of adequacy of a philosophical account of causation. What exactly are we after when 
we try to analyse causation: Is it some objective structure of reality, or part of our conceptual 
system, or the meaning of causal expressions in language? Different standards of adequacy are 
appropriate depending on the type of enquiry we are engaged in.   
The most fundamental criterion of adequacy, accepted by all philosophical accounts, is 
overall coherence. A theory that allows for contradictions, or licences incoherent judgments, is 
unacceptable. Another crucial criterion of adequacy for philosophical theories of causation is 
agreement with common-sense intuition
10
. Indeed, the main strategy for criticizing a 
                                                                                                                                                        
2008, p. 194), claiming that it aims at analysing scientific methodology, rather then the structure of reality revealed 
by science. Cf. also Strevens (2008). 
6
 The list is not exhaustive. To mention another recent proposal, Glennan has suggested analyzing causation in terms 
of the notion of mechanism: “Events are causally related when there is a mechanism that connects them” (Glennan, 
1996, p. 49). However, such an analysis cannot succeed because causation is among the irreducible conceptual 
instruments of mechanistic analysis. As I have shown elsewhere (Kistler 2009) mechanist causation rests in the last 
instance on the causation of fundamental physical processes. Another important approach to the semantics of causal 
language and more generally to the cognitive representation of causation uses the concept of force to analyze the 
causal structure of processes with the help of “force-dynamic patterns” (Talmy 1988, p. 54). See Wolff, this volume, 
Copley&Harley, this volume. Mumford and Anjum (2011a; 2011b) have used a similar framework, in which forces 
and other “powers” are represented by vectors, to construct a metaphysical theory of causation. 
7
 Fair (1979). Hall (2004) and Wolff, this volume, call the concept analysed by theories of this category the 
“production” concept of causation. 
8
 Dowe (2000), Kistler (2006). 
9
 Salmon (1984). 
10
 Intuitions are also the focus of psychological research on causal judgments. Gopnik and Schulz (2007) explore, 
e.g., to what extent children’s and adults’ causal intuitions match the results of the interventionist theory of 
causation. Causal intuitions are also experimentally explored by Knobe and Fraser’s (2008) application of 
“experimental philosophy” to causation. See Egré, this volume. 
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philosophical account is to come up with a counterexample. A counterexample against an 
analysis A of causation is a causal statement S (or the situation described by S) such that S is 
intuitively true but A predicts S to be false, or S is intuitively false but A predicts S to be true. 
Besides such direct or first order intuitions about which causal statements are true, there 
are also intuitions of a more abstract kind. Such “second order” intuitions express general 
intuitive constraints on causality. One is the asymmetry between cause and effect: Given two 
particular events c and e, it is inacceptable that c is the (or a) cause of e, and that at the same time 
and for the same events c and e, e is the (or a) cause of c. This implies the intuition that no 
particular event causes itself. 
Agreement with intuition would be the only criterion if the only aim of philosophical 
theorizing were conceptual analysis. Uncovering the conceptual structure expressed in ordinary 
language is, I take it, among the aims of ordinary language semantics and cognitive psychology. 
However, philosophical theories aim, at least sometimes, at the structure of reality. To discover it, 
philosophical analyses usually take common sense intuitions into account, but insofar as the 
conceptual structure of common sense is only a defeasible indicator of the structure of reality, 
philosophers will sometimes criticize common sense intuitions
11
. The aim of knowing the 
structure of reality is not hopeless insofar as science provides us with an access to reality that is 
in part independent of common sense. Here is one reason for which a philosophical theory cannot 
rest content with the criterion of agreement with common sense intuition. If there are mutually 
incompatible intuitions, a theory cannot both aim at representing reality and at being faithful to 
all intuitions. Reality cannot be inconsistent even though intuitions can. Another, though weaker, 
reason to think that philosophy must sometimes go beyond intuitions, is that none of the 
philosophical accounts of causation proposed so far agrees with all intuitions. In other words, 
there are counterexamples to all of them
12
. 
Some (but not all) authors also consider it to be essential for a satisfactory analysis of 
causation to be compatible with contemporary science. If the theory of special relativity tells us 
that two points in space-time are at a “space-like” distance, which means that the distance 
                                                
11
 In Strawson’s (1959) terms, “descriptive metaphysics” aims at uncovering and analyzing the conceptual structure 
underlying common sense judgments, whereas “revisionary metaphysics” also intends to criticize and improve it. 
12
 Some counterexamples will be considered below, in section 3. In section 4 below, I will put forward an account 
that is compatible with most intuitions as well as with science. However, it is revisionary in contradicting some 
intuitions, e.g. those that take omissions to be causes.  
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between them cannot be bridged by any physical process, not even if it has the speed of light, no 
account of causation is acceptable that judges them to be causally related. 
However, it may turn out to be impossible to satisfy agreement with all intuitions and with 
science, while preserving coherence. Here is an example of a conflict among intuitions, in this 
case between direct intuitions and the requirement of the asymmetry of causation. Ice cubes cool 
drinks. Let us call c a particular melting of an ice cube in a particular glass of water, and e, a 
subsequent drop in the temperature of water in that glass. Intuitively, c causes e. The melting of 
the ice cube causes the cooling of the water. But now consider what happens from the point of 
view of the water. The event e, the cooling of the water, can also be described as the event of the 
water’s giving off some heat. For some material object to cool down just is the object’s losing 
part of its heat. But now we can see that it is precisely the heat lost by the water that is transferred 
to the ice cube and that it is precisely the transference of this quantity that melts the ice. 
Therefore, we find, in violation of the principle of the asymmetry of causation, that both c causes 
e and e causes c. 
Here is a simple conflict between intuition and science. The propagation of the peak of a 
wave propagating on the surface of a lake appears to be a causal process but it is not, as can be 
seen from the fact that the speed of the peak of a wave can exceed the speed of light, something 
no causal process can do
13
. 
In sum, philosophical research on causation is conducted on the background of three 
different criteria of adequacy: 1) overall coherence of the set of causal statements judged true by 
the theory, 2) agreement with intuitions and 3) agreement with contemporary science. It turns out 
to be impossible to meet all these criteria, which makes it necessary to rank them by their relative 
importance. Different rankings yield different types of philosophical analyses of causation. 
For a philosophical theory, coherence is not negotiable
14
. Ranking agreement with 
common sense over agreement with science, or disregarding agreement with science altogether, 
is justified if the main task of philosophy is taken to be conceptual analysis. The task of science is 
to find out about the structure of reality, whereas philosophy should limit itself to uncovering and 
                                                
13
 The peak of a wave travels with so-called “phase velocity”. In certain circumstances, “the phase velocity does 
exceed c [i.e. the speed of light; M.K.], but that does not mean that it is in conflict with the theory of relativity.” 
Crawford (1968, p. 170). 
14
 The analysis of linguistic practices or intuitive judgments will often show that such judgments are incoherent. 
Such incoherence raises no problem for semantics or cognitive psychology: A theory of representations can be 
correct even if the representations are mutually inconsistent. 
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analyzing the structure of our conceptual system
15
. The problem is that there is no guarantee that 
our intuitive conceptual system does not yield incoherent causal judgments. If two intuitively true 
causal judgments contradict either each other or some general principle such as the asymmetry of 
causation, as is the case with our two judgments on the melting ice cube, coherence must be 
restored by rejecting one or several intuitively true causal judgments. One of the judgments on 
the ice cube - that it cools the water and that the water heats it - must be false although both are 
intuitively correct. However, there seems to be no way of deciding which intuition to keep and 
which to abandon. As intuitions, they seem equally compelling.  
This problem can be solved by requiring agreement with science, and ranking it over 
agreement with common sense. In case of conflict between intuitions, science decides which to 
keep and which to abandon. Such a choice of criteria of adequacy characterizes a different 
conception of the task of a philosophical account of causation, according to which causation is an 
objective part of the structure of reality. More precisely, causation is a natural kind of relation (or 
process)
16
, in the sense in which gold, water, cats, or humans can be conceived of as natural kinds 
of substances or individuals. 
The concept of a natural kind is traditionally defined by distinguishing it from kinds of 
artefacts (such as screwdriver) or common sense kinds (such as grass): Kinds of artefacts and 
common sense kinds have a nominal essence, in other words some set of defining features, but 
the objects belonging to such kinds do not share any common intrinsic property. They have no 
real essence
17
. The kind “screwdriver” can be defined in functional terms (an object that can be 
used to screw or unscrew screws), but what makes a screwdriver a screwdriver is no feature of 
the screwdriver itself. Its being a screwdriver depends on its being used as such by an agent. If I 
use one half of a pair of scissors as a screwdriver, it thereby becomes a screwdriver, at least on 
that occasion.  
Contrary to artefacts, natural kinds have a real essence. The real essence of gold is the 
property of being (mostly) composed of atoms with atomic number 79. This is an objective 
feature possessed by all and only samples of gold. If we consider causation as a natural kind 
concept, agreement with science will be ranked higher than agreement with common sense 
                                                
15
 This conception of philosophy has been forcefully defended by Jackson (1998). 
16
 I owe this idea to E.J. Lowe (personal communication). 
17
 The concept of a real essence has been introduced in the 17th century by Locke. It is the modern descendant of the 
Aristotelian notion of secondary substance, and of the medieval notion of substantial form.  
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intuition. We have seen that conceptual analysis theories have no principled reason to reject one 
or the other of two incompatible causal judgments. Agreement with science may at least 
sometimes provide an objective ground for choosing. From the point of view of the physical 
process of heat transfer linking the melting of the ice cube and the cooling of the water, the water 
heats the ice cube, not the other way round.  
Accepting agreement with contemporary scientific knowledge as a criterion of adequacy 
can also be a source of conflicts. Sometimes, conflicts between intuition and science are resolved 
by integrating scientific knowledge into common sense. Thus, at some point after the seventeenth 
century it has become part of common sense that the earth moves and revolves around the sun. 
However, not all such conflicts have been resolved in this way. I have mentioned above that the 
propagation of the peak of a wave is not a causal process. However, it is intuitively obvious that 
waves, such as tsunamis, can cause a lot of destruction. From a scientific point of view, the 
conflict is due to the fact that common sense does not distinguish the propagation of a wave 
packet (which is a causal process) and the propagation of a particular phase of a wave, such as its 
peak (which is not a causal process). In a theory of causation that takes it to be a natural kind, 
some common sense causal judgments are rejected even though they are not in conflict with other 
common sense judgments, but because they are incompatible with science. 
The fact that scientific knowledge gets absorbed, sometimes after having overcome some 
resistance, into common sense, has consequences for the philosophical analysis of causation. If 
the task of philosophical analysis is pure conceptual analysis, causation itself changes each time 
some relevant piece of scientific knowledge gets integrated into common sense. But if the task of 
a philosophical theory of causation is taken to be the elaboration of a natural kind concept, 
causation is independent of how much science common sense has absorbed. We learn more and 
more about causation, just as we learn more about gold, but this progress of our knowledge does 
not result in any change in causation itself. 
Recourse to science is the only non arbitrary way of resolving conflicts among intuitive 
judgments. The fact that scientific judgments are rationally justified makes it also rational to give 
priority to scientific judgments in cases of conflict between science and intuition. My aim in what 
follows will therefore be to construct an account of causation as a natural kind of relation. 
 
4. Counterexamples to traditional philosophical accounts of causation 
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Bearing in mind what we just have found out about the task of a philosophical account of 
causation, let us look at some counterexamples to the analyses of causation mentioned above
18
.  
According to the DN analysis, the causal relation is equivalent to the relation between 
premises and conclusion of a scientific explanation, which is analyzed in its turn as a DN 
argument. Many explanations are counterexamples against the DN analysis of causation. One can 
construct a DN argument that deduces the height of a tower from the length of the shadow it 
casts
19
; and one can construct a DN argument in which a storm is explained by the falling of the 
barometer preceding it. Nevertheless, the length of the shadow is not among the causes of the 
height of the tower, and the falling of the barometer is not among the causes of the storm. 
According to the fundamental hypothesis of probabilistic analyses, A is a cause of B if 
and only if (1) the occurrence of A raises the probability of the occurrence of B, such that P(B|A) 
> P(B|¬A), and (2) this inequality is not due to a common cause
20
 of A and B: there is no C, such 
that P(B|A&C) = P(B|¬A&C). However, probabilistic analyses are ill tuned to account for 
causality between particular events. Conditions (1) and (2) are not sufficient for a token event a 
(of type A) to be a cause of a token event b (of type B). Although smoking raises the probability 
of getting lung cancer, John’s smoking may well not cause his getting cancer. Even if John 
smokes and gets lung cancer, the cause of his disease may be his inhalation of asbestos dust, not 
his smoking. Here is a situation
21
 showing that it is not necessary for particular event a (of type 
A) to cause particular event b (of type B), that A raises the probability of B at the type level. 
Being myself very bad at shooting, I find myself in company of a good hunter who hands me his 
rifle at the sight of a deer. The situation is such that he shoots if (and only if) I don’t. Then my 
firing the rifle may kill the deer although it lowers the probability of the deer’s getting killed.  
At the level of types, the main problem for probabilistic analyses is the dependence of 
conditional probabilities on the choice of variables. Say one finds that, in a given set, the 
conditional probability of factor B given factor A is higher than the probability of B in the 
absence of A: P(B|A) > P(B|¬A). If the set in which these probabilities are measured is not 
homogeneous with respect to other variables that influence B, there is no guarantee that the 
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 For more comprehensive presentations of the contemporary debate on causation, see Kistler (2002), Kistler (2011), 
and Schaffer (2003). 
19
 This example is from Bromberger (1966). 
20
 Such a common cause is often called a “screening factor”. 
 10 
inequality is due to a causal influence of A on B. Consider the following scenario, loosely based 
on a famous discrimination suit brought against the University of California, Berkeley
22
. The 
University is accused of discriminating against women, on the basis of the observation that the 
probability to be admitted (B) is higher for male applicants (A) than for female (¬A): P(B|A) > 
P(B|¬A). It turns out that this inequality reverses once the set of candidates is partitioned 
according to the departments they apply to. Both history (C) and geography (¬C) in fact favour 
women over men, so that: P(B|A & C) < P(B|¬A & C) and P(B|A & ¬C) < P(B|¬A & ¬C). The 
explanation of this reversal, which is an instance of “Simpson’s paradox”
23
, is that women apply 
more often than men in history where the probability of success is much lower than in geography. 
Cartwright (1983) shows that this difficulty can be overcome by taking into account all factors 
that might possibly influence the candidates’ admission. However, it is controversial whether it 
makes sense to make use of conditional probabilities taken over populations that are 
homogeneous with respect to all factors that influence the effect factor
24
. 
The counterfactual account has been criticised among other reasons, because some effects 
do not seem to depend counterfactually on their causes, for example because the cause is 
accompanied by a back-up factor. Assume your stomach contains enzymes A and B, which can 
both decompose protein C, and A is more reactive, in the sense that B steps in if and only if A is 
absent. Then, take a situation in which A has caused decomposition of C. Given the presence of 
the back-up cause B, it is not true that the decomposition of C is counterfactually dependent on 
the presence of A: it would have occurred even in the absence of A, because it would then have 
been caused by B. Situations of this type are often referred to with the expression “redundant 
causation” or “pre-emption”
25
. In our case, A causes C, B is a redundant cause of C, and B’s 
causing C is said to be “pre-empted” by A’s causing C. This shows that counterfactual 
dependence is not necessary for causation. Another problem is raised by the fact that an event b 
may counterfactually depend on some event a that is not among its causes, for example because a 
                                                                                                                                                        
21
 Cf. Edgington (1997, p. 420). 
22
 Cf. Cartwright (1983, p. 37). 
23
 Cf. Malinas and Bigelow (2009). 
24
 Cartwright (1983, p. 38) and Hardcastle (1991) defend this solution, whereas Dupre and Cartwright (1988) argue 
against it. The requirement of using probabilities taken over homogenous sets raises two problems: the first is that it 
requires that one already knows which factors influence the effect variable, threatening the account with circularity. 
The second is that it undermines the very reason to use probabilities as a means to analyze causality: intermediate 
probabilities between 0 and 1 reflect the fact that one cannot practically take into account all factors influencing the 
effect variable (Kistler 2002). 
25
 Cf. Wolff, this volume, and Thomason, this volume. 
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and b are effects of a common cause. This shows that counterfactual dependence is not sufficient 
for causation either. 
According to transference accounts, which are an important subclass of process theories 
of causation
26
, event a is a cause of event b if and only if something, such as a particular amount 
of energy, is transferred between events a and b. The main problem for such approaches is that 
we judge causal many relations such as omission, prevention, interruption or disconnection, in 
which nothing flows from cause to effect: if I cause a shortage in gas by shutting down the 
pipeline, there seems to be no transmission whatsoever between cause and effect. 
 
5. Two kinds of intuition about causation 
 
The intuitions behind the counterexamples to the accounts mentioned seem to fall in two 
categories. Most counterexamples to the DN, probabilistic and counterfactual accounts rely on 
the intuition that transference of energy (or of some other conserved quantity) is necessary or 
sufficient for causation. The judgment that the falling of the barometer is not among the causes of 
the storm following it is grounded on the fact that nothing flows or is transmitted from the falling 
of the barometer to the storm; the causal processes transferring energy to both of these events 
originate from a third event, the drop of atmospheric pressure, which causes both the falling of 
the barometer and the storm. The judgment according to which I, and not the expert hunter, am 
the cause of the deer’s getting shot, is grounded on the fact that there is a process of transmission, 
corresponding to the trajectory of the bullet, linking my shooting to the death of the deer, but no 
such process between the hunter and the death of the deer, although the deer’s death does not 
counterfactually depend on my shooting and my shooting lowers the probability of its death. An 
analysis of causation in terms of transference can account for both intuitions. 
On the other hand, counterexamples to the transference account rely on the intuition that 
nomic dependency is sufficient for causation. The judgment according to which shutting down 
the pipeline causes a shortage in gas, seems to be justified by a lawful dependence between 
supply of gas and transport of the gas through the pipeline. The interruption statement is made 
true by the same dependence: failure of supply determines absence of gas, just as supply 
determines presence of gas. Therefore, the intuition that a failure of supply through the pipeline 
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 Cf. Wolff, this volume.  
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causes the shortage of gas can be accounted for by theories that reduce causation to nomic 
dependency (DN analysis) or to relations closely related to nomic dependency, such as 
counterfactual dependency, probability raising and manipulability
27
. These intuitions are 
grounded on what Hall (2004) calls the “dependence” concept of causation
28
. 
We seem to face a dilemma: either nomic dependency is necessary and sufficient for 
causation or transference is necessary and sufficient. The former hypothesis seems to be refuted 
by intuitive causal judgments about situations where a common cause has two effects, between 
which there is nomic dependence but no causation, or in which the cause of a given event is 
accompanied by a back-up cause. The latter hypothesis seems to be refuted by intuitive causal 
judgments in which a negative event is the cause, as in omission, or the effect, as in prevention or 
disconnection. Some philosophers have taken this predicament as a reason to embrace 
eliminativism
29
, scepticism
30
, or pluralism
31
. The eliminativist judges that no coherent analysis of 
the concept of causation is possible, and concludes that it must therefore be eliminated from a 
scientifically and philosophically informed world-view. The sceptic argues that the central role of 
our concept of causation in our thinking makes it uneliminable but that it is impossible to 
understand or coherently analyse it, because all possible conceptual analyses of causation have 
been explored and found wanting. Pluralists argue that the failure to find a satisfying account of 
causation is due to the erroneous supposition that there is only one such concept; once it is 
assumed that there are different types of causation, different and satisfying analyses can be found 
for each of them.  
However, we should not give up so easily the search for a unified account of causation. 
Here is my strategy for constructing an account of causation that is compatible with science and, 
as far as possible, with intuition. In section 6, I will review the syntactic and semantic analysis of 
common sense causal statements in order to find a hypothesis about the structure of common 
sense intuitions. Section 7 then suggests which natural kinds of relations, in the sense explained 
above, provide the best fit with both scientific knowledge and intuitions having that structure. 
 
                                                
27
 In section 5 below, we shall return to negative causes and effects. 
28
 See also Wolff, this volume. 
29
 The classic statement of eliminativism with respect to causation is in Russell (1912). 
30
 See Schaffer (2006). 
31
 Hall (2004), Reiss (2009), Psillos (2009). Against pluralists, Wolff, this volume, argues that a unified account of 
causation can be built in the framework of force dynamics. 
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6. Two kinds of causal statements 
 
In this section, I will review results of the linguistic and philosophical analysis of ordinary 
causal statements, in order to uncover the structure of the intuitions described above, and in 
particular to discover the nature of the relata of causation
32
. Here are five statements about a 
situation in which something about the fact that Mary sings surprises me, or causes my surprise. 
 
(1) Her performing the song surprised me. 
(2) That she performed the song surprised me. 
(3) The fact that she performed the song surprised me. 
(4) The performing of the song surprised me. 
(5) The performance of the song surprised me. 
 
With respect to their meaning, the expressions referring to the cause in these expressions 
fall into two categories. The expressions (1a), (2a), and (3a) designating the cause respectively in 
(1), (2) and (3), are factive, whereas the expressions (4a) and (5a) designating the cause in (4) and 
(5) are “eventive”, in a sense to be explained below. 
The following expressions are factive insofar as they make reference to facts or factive 
entities: 
(1a) her performing the song.  
(2a) that she performed the song. 
(3a) the fact that she performed the song. 
We shall say more in a moment about the facts or factive entities these expressions refer 
to. The following expressions are on the contrary eventive insofar as they make reference to 
events: 
(4a) the performing of the song.  
(5a) the performance of the song.  
Let me say some words about the syntactic structure of these factive and eventive 
expressions designating causes. Here is a hypothesis about the syntactic structure of expressions 
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 What follows is based on Kistler (1999) and (2006). The linguistic analyses are due to Vendler (1967a; 1967b) and 
Zucchi (1993). 
 14 
of type G (“verbal gerund”, such as (1a)), type P (“perfect gerund”, such as (4a)), and type D 
(“derived nominal”, such as (5a))
33
: 
 
(G) [NP [NP Her] [VP performing the song]]
34
 
(P) [NP [Det The] [N' [N performing] [PP of the song]]] 
(D) [NP [Det The] [N' [N performance] [PP of the song]]] 
 
This analysis supports the following hypothesis: 
(H1) Nominal phrases (NP) of type G contain a verbal phrase (VP);  
NPs of type P and D do not contain any VP.  
 
H1 can be justified by the fact that it can explain a number of grammatical differences 
between G, P and D:  
Expressions of types D and P, but not expressions of type G, can take an article (definite 
or indefinite).   
(6) The performing of the song (Zucchi, p. 38) 
(7) * the performing the song (Zucchi, p. 51) 
Expressions P and D, but not G, can be modified by an adjective.  
(8) “The beautiful singing of the song we heard (Vendler 1967a, p. 707),  
(9) * “His beautiful performing the song” (Zucchi, p. 53) 
Expressions of type G, but not those of types P and D, can be modified by adverbs.  
(10) her beautifully performing the song 
(11) * her beautifully performing of the song 
G, but not P, can be negated. 
(12) her not performing the song 
(13) *her not performing of the song 
(H1) explains these facts because VPs can be modified by adverbs and can be negated, 
whereas typical NPs take an article and can be modified by an adjective
35
. 
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 The distinction is due to Vendler (1967a; 1967b) and has been elaborated by Bennett (1988) and Zucchi (1993). 
34
 Zucchi (1993), p. 48, attributes this analysis to Chomsky (1981). 
35
 “[…] the noun phrases typically associated with the ‘fact’-group turn out to be imperfectly nominalized sentences, 
whereas those appropriate to the ‘event’-group are exclusively perfectly nominalized sentences. The difference 
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These syntactic differences are linked to semantic differences that are crucial for our 
purposes. Here is a hypothesis about the semantic difference concerning their reference, between 
expressions of type G and expressions of type P and D.  
 
(H2) Expressions of type G designate facts; expressions of types P and D designate 
events. 
 
Let us look at the meaning that expressions of types G, P and D take in the context of 
causal statements, with the help of the statements about Mary’s song and the surprise it causes. 
Imagine that Mary uses to perform the song at home but that she is afraid of doing it before a 
large audience. Now I learn that she performed the song on the stage of the Paris Opera.  
In this situation, statements (1), (2) and (3) are false. (1), (2) and (3) are all false, for they 
say that it is the fact that she performed the song that caused my surprise. However, it is not the 
fact that she performed the song, but the particular circumstances under which she did it, that are 
responsible for my surprise. On the other hand, statements (4) and (5) are true in that situation, 
for there is something about her performance that causes my surprise. It is true that, as (5) says, 
Mary’s performance, as a particular event, caused my surprise. The crucial difference is that 
events are particulars, and thus have properties that are not named in the expressions that refer to 
them, whereas the structure of a fact corresponds to the structure of the proposition expressing it: 
The proposition “Mary sings” refers to the fact that Mary sings, which is composed by an object 
and a property. This suggests that expressions of types G, P and D keep their usual meaning, even 
when they are embedded in causal contexts: G-expressions designate facts, P- and D-expressions 
designate events. 
 
(H3) Gerundive nominalizations of type G and P and derived event nouns of type D have 
their usual meaning within causal contexts.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
between these two kinds of nominal is the following. In the imperfect nominal the verb keeps some of its verb-like 
features: it retains the verb-object intact; tenses, modals and adverbs may be present; and the whole structure is 
subject to negation. The verb in the perfect nominal sheds these verb-like features and behaves like a noun: it may 
take relative clauses, adjectives, articles, and prepositions.” (Vendler 1967a, p. 707) 
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Causal statements can contain expressions of both types. This suggests that the causal 
predicate can also take two different meanings, corresponding to the expressions designating the 
cause and the effect. There are two types of causal statements, expressing two aspects of the 
concept of causation
36
. I will call “causation” the relation expressed by eventive causal 
statements, in which the argument places of the causal verb are filled by expressions (of type P or 
D) designating events. I will call “causal responsibility” the relation expressed by factive causal 
statements, in which the argument places of the causal verb are filled by factive expressions, in 
other words, expressions (of type G) designating facts. 
 
(H4) There are causal statements of two types, one expressing causation between events, 
the other causal responsibility of one fact for another fact. 
 
In order to uncover the conceptual structure of the relations of causation and causal 
responsibility and the articulation of the two, one strategy is to examine the inferences that can 
validly be drawn from causal statements of one type to causal statements of the other type. What 
we find is that factual causal statements always
37
 entail eventive causal statements. In the 
simplest type of a factive causal statement, the cause is the fact F1 that event c has property G; the 
effect is the fact F2 that the event e has the property H. The form of an elementary factive causal 
statement is CR (Gc, He): The fact that c is G is causally responsible (abridged by “CR”) for the 
fact that e is H. From factive causal statements of that form, one can infer an eventive causal 
statement: c causes e.  
Take proposition (2): That she performed the song surprised me. According to our 
analysis, the cause is a fact (that c is F) and consists of the possession of a property F by an event 
c. F is the property of performing the song. True, (2) attributes this property to an object (in fact a 
person, Mary), rather than to an event. However, causes are situated in time, and it is only a 
certain temporal part of Mary whose possession of F is the cause of my surprise. (2) says that the 
cause of my surprise is the fact that she, at a certain time (event c), has the property F of 
performing the song. 
                                                
36
 Hall (2004) argues that there are two concepts of causation. However, it is more correct to speak of two aspects 
because, as I will argue, one is part of the other. 
37
 In section 8 below, we will consider apparent counterexamples to this claim. 
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Proposition (2) entails proposition (4): The performing of the song surprised me. If the 
fact that she performed it surprised me, then something about the event of the performance 
surprised me, and therefore, the event (c) surprised me. 
However, the opposite is not true. (4) may be true because some unusual aspect of the 
performance has caused my surprise, while the mere fact that she performs it would not have 
been surprising. In other words, (4), or for that matter (5), do not entail any of (1), (2), or (3). In 
fact, eventive causal statements never entail factual statements. An eventive causal statement 
according to which event c causes event e – symbolized by C(c,e) - never contains information 
about what it is about the cause c, in other words about which fact it is concerning event c, that is 
causally responsible for some fact about e. 
 
7. Causal relations and causal responsibility 
 
We can explain the possibility of inferring eventive statements from factive causal 
statements, and the impossibility of making inferences in the reverse direction, by making a 
simple hypothesis about what makes those statements true, in other words, about their 
truthmakers. I suggest that what makes the eventive statement C(c, e) true is part of what makes 
the factive statement CR(Gc, He) true. The factive statement CR(Gc, He) has the meaning of a 
conjunction that contains C(c, e) as one conjunct.  
Let me say a few words at this point on the notion of a truthmaker of a statement or 
proposition
38
. According to the traditional correspondence theory of truth, a proposition p is true 
if and only if there is some fact f that has the same structure as p, so that for each constituent of p, 
there is a corresponding constituent of f. The proposition that Desdemona loves Cassio is true if 
and only if there is a fact consisting of Desdemona, Cassio, and the relation of the former loving 
the latter
39
. The notion of truthmaker is grounded on the fundamental idea that if a statement is 
true, or is a “truth”, this is due to some fact. “The idea of a truthmaker for a particular truth […] 
is just some existent, some portion of reality, in virtue of which that truth is true.” (Armstrong 
2004, p. 5) The concept of a truthmaker preserves the central idea of the correspondence theory 
of truth, but denies that there is always a one-to-one correspondence between true propositions 
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 Cf. Armstrong (2004). 
39
 Cf. Russell (1912a), and Engel (2002). 
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(truths) and facts by virtue of which they are true. For many kinds of true propositions, there does 
not seem to exist any fact that shares its structure and has corresponding components. In 
particular, there do not seem to be facts corresponding to negative propositions. The proposition 
that Theaetetus is not flying is true although there is no fact constituted by Theaetetus and the 
negative property of not-flying. If we take properties to be what David Lewis calls “sparse” 
properties
40
, there are no negative properties that would mirror negated predicates
41
. There are 
also many cases where one fact makes true many different propositions. If fact f makes true 
proposition p, then, for any arbitrary proposition q, f makes also true p ! q. Moreover, most, if 
not all, propositions are made true by many facts. If f makes true p, then, for any arbitrary fact g, f 
" g makes also true p. Each individual human being is a truth-maker for the truth that there are 
human beings (Armstrong 2004, p. 21), and the world as a whole (the conjunction of all facts
42
) 
is a truth-maker for every truth (Armstrong 2004, p. 18). In what follows, the expression “truth-
maker for p” will be short-hand for “minimal truth-maker for p”, which is such that “you cannot 
subtract anything from [it] and the remainder still be a truthmaker for p” (Armstrong 2004, p. 19). 
I will use the concept of truthmaking as a means to achieve the second step of the strategy 
announced above: find natural kinds of relation that fit as well as possible both with scientific 
knowledge and with the intuitions uncovered by the analysis of common sense causal statements.  
Here is my suggestion. The truthmaker of a factive causal statement of the form CR(Gc, 
He), saying that the fact that c is G is causally responsible for the fact that e is H, is equivalent to 
the conjunction: C(c,e) " Gc " He " L(G,H), where the latter conjunct represents a law of nature 
linking property G to property H. On this analysis, the truth of CR(Gc, He) entails the existence of 
a causal relation between the events c and e (first conjunct), the possession of property G by the 
cause event (second conjunct), the possession of property H by the effect event (third conjunct) 
and the existence of a relation of nomological dependence (i.e. a law of nature) between the 
                                                
40
The distinction between “sparse” or “natural” properties and “abundant” properties has been introduced by 
Armstrong and Lewis. The sparse properties are those "perfectly natural" (Lewis 1986a, p. 61) properties that "carve 
[nature] at the joints" (Lewis 1986a, p. 60). We may rely on science to find out what they are. Cf. Armstrong (1979, 
p. 8). By contrast, “abundant” properties correspond to the semantic value of arbitrary meaningful predicates. My 
desk has the abundant property of being “wooden or pink” simply because it is wooden, and therefore wooden or 
pink. Sharing a natural property, but not sharing an abundant property, makes objects qualitatively similar. 
41 Armstrong (2004, p. 58) argues that the truthmaker of a negative statement such as “Theaetetus is not flying” is the 
conjunction of all first-order states of affairs (or facts) corresponding to the (“positive”) properties of Theaetetus, 
together with the higher-order state of affairs that these are all states of affairs involving Theaetetus. 
42
 Cf. Armstrong 1997, chap. 8.8. 
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properties G and H (fourth conjunct). The first conjunct is the truthmaker of an eventive causal 
statement
43
. 
Our analysis of the relation between eventive causal statements and laws looks almost 
exactly like the converse of an analysis suggested by Davidson. “Very often”, he says, “our 
justification for accepting a singular causal statement is that we have reason to believe an 
appropriate causal law exists, though we do not know what it is” (Davidson 1967, p. 160). This 
suggests the following analysis: C(c,e) only if there are G, H and a law L(G,H) such that 
CR(Gc,He). One might then try to turn this necessary condition into the following necessary and 
sufficient condition by adding the existence of a relation of transference between c and e
44
:  
(E) C(c,e) if and only if there is a relation of transference between c and e and there are G, 
H and a law L(G,H), such that CR(Gc, He).  
Indeed, C(c,e) is made true by a relation of transmission of conserved quantities between 
c and e. This guarantees that there is a conserved quantity F=G instantiated by c and e and a 
conservation law linking these instances. However, their apparent similarity hides an important 
difference between the analysis of CR(Gc, He) and (E). The former shows that factive causal 
statements contain explicit information about which property G of the cause is responsible for a 
given property H of the effect, whereas the latter shows that the truth of an eventive statement 
only guarantees the existence of properties G, H and a law linking them, without containing 
explicit information about what they are.  
The two sorts of truthmakers, for factive and eventive causal statements, satisfy both 
requirements we have set out in beginning of the paper (section 2). They are promising 
candidates for being “natural kinds of relations”, which means that they 1) are in general in 
agreement with intuitions and 2) can be the object of scientific investigation.  
The truthmaker of eventive causal statements is a transmission relation between events. 
Such statements express the intuition that causation is grounded on some mechanical process of 
transference. The exact nature of the transference relation, and in particular of what is transferred, 
is discovered progressively by scientific inquiry: It was first suggested that what is transferred is 
energy, force, or information, but the most plausible hypothesis now seems to be that it is an 
amount of some conserved quantity
45
. 
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 We return to the nature of this truthmaker in a moment. 
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 This alternative analysis has been suggested to me by Isabelle Drouet. 
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 Energy is a conserved quantity, whereas force and information are not. See Kistler (1998, p. 21, note 20). 
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However, such eventive causal statements are rather exceptional. The reason is that the 
information they provide is sufficiently informative only in exceptional circumstances. As a reply 
to most requests for causal explanation, an explanation of a given effect is accepted as 
satisfactory only if it goes beyond the mere indication of the identity of the cause event. In 
general, one wants to know in addition what it is about the cause event that is responsible for a 
certain aspect of the effect event. Eventive statements cannot provide such information, but 
factive statements can
46
. The latter express, over and above the transference aspect, the aspect of 
nomological dependence between the relevant properties of cause and effect. The truthmaker of 
factive causal statements, the relation of causal responsibility, contains the truthmaker of eventive 
statements as a part. The other part of it is the relation of nomic dependence: It satisfies our 
requirements because 1) science can enquire whether there are laws of nature underlying a given 
dependency between types of events, and which these laws are, and 2) lawful dependence 
accounts for the intuitions that motivate the alternative approaches to the transference account, 
DN, counterfactual, probability raising and interventionism. 
How can this analysis justify common sense causal judgments such as our proposition (2): 
That she performed the song surprised me? First, (2) can only be true if there is some process of 
transmission originating from an event including Mary on the scene and myself immediately 
afterwards. The first part of the process is the propagation of light from Mary to the retina of my 
eyes; the second is the process of transmission of nervous signals from my retinas to my cortex. 
At the level of properties, the propagation of light from the scene to the retina, the transduction of 
the incoming light into a nervous signal, and the transmission of the signal through the cortex all 
obey laws. We are certainly far from understanding which incoming signals will lead, in a given 
background of representations, to surprise. However, according to our hypothesis, the claim that 
the fact that Mary performed is causally responsible for the fact that I am surprised can only be 
true if there are such laws
47
. 
 
8. The challenge of negative causes and effects 
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 This is compatible with the result of Bennett’s analysis of the difference between causal statements of these two 
kinds. “Event-causation statements … are not very informative, because they existentially quantify over a class of 
fact-causation statements… The language of fact causation is more sensitive and flexible than the other. This fits it 
for use in reporting causal connections in fine-grained and unmisleading ways of which the language of event 
causation is quite incapable.” (Bennett 1988, p. 139). 
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For lack of space, I cannot provide here a full defence of the account of causation 
suggested above. In this last section, I will just address two major objections. According to the 
first, there is no causation between facts; according to the second, there is no causation between 
events. 
According to Davidson (1967), causation is exclusively a relation between events. 
Genuine causal statements express a relation between events; the statements we have called 
“factive causal statements” are not causal statements in the strict sense, i.e. they do not make 
reference to causal relations. Rather, they are “rudimentary causal explanations”, and 
“explanations typically relate statements, not events” (Davidson 1967, p. 161). True, a factive 
statement of the form CR(Gc, He) contains more information, and is thus more explanatory, than 
the corresponding eventive statement C(c, e). After all, the latter only tells us that c causes e, but 
not why. The factive statement indicates which property of the cause is responsible for a given 
property of the effect. However, the fact that causal explanations typically contain additional 
information about the causal relata, over and above their mere identity as events, is not sufficient 
to establish that such explanations do not make reference to causal relations at all. Here are two 
arguments for the claim that they do. 
First, there are situations in which it is explanatory to merely indicate the event c that is 
the cause of a given event e. If you already know that the fire broke out because a short-circuit 
overheated the wire, you may be looking for the crucial additional bit of information of when and 
where that short-circuit occurred. You might already know that the explanation is either that a 
short circuit in the kitchen caused the fire CR(Gc1, He) or that a short-circuit in the bathroom 
caused the fire CR(Gc2, He). The mere indication of whether the short circuit occurred at event c1 
(containing an appropriate part of the kitchen at the appropriate time) or event c2 (containing an 
appropriate part of the bathroom at the appropriate time) fills this informational gap. Here, I take 
events to be what fills a given space-time region
48
. This shows that, contrary to what Davidson 
suggests, giving information on the causes of an event can be a way of explaining it.  
Second, the fact that factive causal statements always entail eventive causal statements, 
shows that factive causal statements bear on causal relations. Our analysis explains the possibility 
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 The relevant laws are partly “laws in situ” (Cummins 2000, p. 121), which hold only for specific systems in 
specific circumstances. 
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 Quine (1985), Kistler (2006). 
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of such an entailment by the fact that the truthmaker of a factive statement contains the 
truthmaker of an eventive causal statement. The latter, the causal relation between events C(c,e), 
is part of the former, the causal responsibility of a fact Fc concerning the cause, for a fact He 
concerning the effect. 
Let us now turn to a second objection to our account, which has been very influential in 
convincing many philosophers that causation is not a relation between events
49
, and does not 
require any transference. Some factive causal statements do not seem to make reference to any 
cause event. Thus, it can be argued that, if there are true factive causal statements whose terms do 
not directly bear on cause and effect events, causation does not require any relation such as 
transference between events.  
Let us have a closer look at how Mellor (1987) argues that causes and effects are facts, 
not events. Here is his example of a causal statement with negative expressions for both cause 
and effect: 
(6) “Don […] did not die because he did not fall.” (Mellor 1987, p. 207) 
Mellor’s argument has the form of a reductio of Davidson’s (1967) thesis that causes and 
effects are events. If Davidson’s analysis were correct, he says, the cause and effect expressions 
in (6) would make reference to events, i.e. particulars
50
. Take the effect event. It would have to be 
the event of Don’s not dying. But now Mellor argues that there is no such event as Don’s non-
dying because it would be a negative particular; and there are no negative particulars
51
. His 
strategy consists in showing that if there were negative events, they would have contradictory 
properties. If Don’s non-dying was an event, it would follow from Davidson’s (1966) analysis 
that this event is both quick and slow. The reason is that “Don does not die” entails both “Don 
does not die quickly” and “Don does not die slowly”. Now, if one applies Davidson’s analysis to 
this case, the adverbs “quickly” and “slowly” qualifying Don’s not dying, express, in the context 
of a causal statement, properties of the alleged event of Don’s not dying. Thus, if there was such 
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 Horgan (1978), Mellor (1987). Vendler (1967a) argues that causes are facts whereas effects are events. According 
to his analysis, causal relations are hybrid in having terms belonging to different ontological categories. His 
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objects. 
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an event as Don’s not dying, Davidson’s analysis would entail that “Don’s non-death will have to 
be both instant and slow; but it cannot be both, so it does not exist.” (Mellor 1987, p. 208)
52
 
Statements such as (6), in which negative expressions designate cause or effect or both 
raise a serious challenge to our analysis. Such negative expressions do not in general contain 
information on the events or properties involved in the relation of causal responsibility making 
true the causal statement. To answer the challenge, let us distinguish two kinds of such 
statements. In statements of the first kind, the expressions making reference to cause and effect 
contain explicit information on events causally related by transmission, but do not mention the 
properties taking part in the relation of causal responsibility. In the second kind of statement, the 
expressions making reference to cause and effect do not even contain explicit information on the 
underlying events. Let us consider them in turn.  
(6) belongs to the first kind. Both the cause and the effect expression make reference to 
Don. Insofar as (6) can interpreted as a factive causal statement, our analysis predicts that its 
meaning can be analysed as: The fact that Don does not fall is causally responsible for the fact 
that Don does not die. No particular times are specified; however, for a given time at which the 
statement is true, we can take the cause event to be a “temporal part” (or “time-slice”) of Don, 
and the effect event to be another, later temporal part of Don. Thus, the truthmaker of (6) is: 
Is causally responsible for (Not fall (Don at t), Not die (Don at t+dt)). 
The times t and t+dt are not part of the content of (6); they are fixed by the context of 
utterance. (6) may be true for many instants t, through a whole stretch of time. 
Here is my reply to Mellor’s challenge: The fact that (6) does not contain any explicit 
information about the properties involved in the relation of causal responsibility, does not show 
that such properties do not exist. If (6) is true, there is a relation of causal responsibility that 
makes it true. What makes (6) appear problematic is the fact that its truthmaker does not mirror 
the structure of its linguistic expression. However, this is characteristic of all negative truths. Just 
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like other negative statements, negative causal statements contain only partial or indirect 
information about their truthmakers. This does not show that they have no truthmakers. Recall 
that no eventive causal statement provides information about the properties involved in causal 
responsibility. Mellor himself suggests which properties may be part of the truthmaker of (6): for 
the cause, Don’s hanging on at the time t of the cause, and for the effect, Don’s surviving at time 
t+dt. (7) is a plausible hypothesis about the truthmaker of (6): 
 
(7) Is causally responsible for (Hangs on (Don at t), Lives (Don at t+dt)). 
 
In sum, the fact that statement (6) does not tell us which properties were responsible for 
the fact that Don survived at a certain time does not entail that there are no such properties, and it 
does not refute the thesis that causal responsibility is a relation between facts consisting in the 
possession of properties by events, or by objects at a time. Here is an example of a scientific 
causal statement in which a negative expression occupies the cause position.  
 
(8) The fact that the repressor is not fixed on the operator is causally responsible for the 
fact that the protein is synthesized.  
 
The context is the so-called “operon theory of gene expression”, developed by Jacob and 
Monod in 1961. It puts forward a mechanism that explains why genes are expressed in proteins 
only in certain situations
53
. The production of a given protein by the mechanism of gene 
expression can be stopped when a so-called repressor protein gets fixed on a portion of DNA 
called the operator. Gene expression is then triggered by an “inductor” molecule that attaches to 
the repressor and detaches it from the operator, thereby making the way free for the process of 
gene expression.  
Naming the cause by a negative expression, (8) is silent about the properties involved in 
triggering the transcription of the gene. As with all negative statements, one cannot read its 
truthmaker off from its linguistic structure. However, (8) has a truthmaker. Although not 
explicitly mentioned by (8), there is a “positive” property of the event implying the operator at 
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the relevant moment before the beginning of transcription, which plays a role in causal 
responsibility: It is the conformation
54
 C of the operator molecule when it is not fixed to the 
repressor. Thus, the truthmaker of (8) may be  
The fact that the operator has conformation C is causally responsible for the fact that the 
protein is synthesized.  
To sum up, we have seen that negative causal statements of the first kind share the 
characteristics of other statements containing negative expressions: They provide only partial 
information about their truthmaker.  
Let us now turn to the second category of causal statements in which one of the cause and 
effect expressions is negative: In statements of this type, the cause or effect expression (or both) 
contains explicit information neither about the cause event in the transmission sense nor about 
causally responsible facts about the events involved. Here is an example: 
 
(9) The father’s not holding back the child made her have an accident. 
 
There has been considerable debate about such omission statements. According to some 
authors, they are causal statements and provide counterexamples to theories according to which 
causation requires transmission between events
55
. Others have argued that they are not strictly 
speaking causal
56
, because a statement such as (9) does not directly express a causal relation. 
Indeed, (9) does not provide any information about the actual cause (of the accident); however, 
such statements may be useful because they carry relevant counterfactual information. (9) 
provides two pieces of information: 1. some not explicitly specified event caused the child’s 
accident, and 2. if the father had held the child back that event would not have happened, and 
thus would not have caused the accident
57
. Here is a scientific example of the same kind
58
. 
 
(10) A mouse’s lacking the fosB gene causes her offspring to die. 
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The context is the genetic technique called “knock out”, which allows producing strains of 
laboratory animals that lack a certain gene. It has been observed that transgenic mice that lack the 
fosB gene neglect their offspring. Like (9), (10) does not provide any information at all about the 
“positive” causes of the death of the mouse’s offspring. However, it provides another piece of 
relevant information: the second part of the truthmaker of (10) is the truthmaker of the 
counterfactual statement that if the mouse had possessed gene fosB, it would have taken care of 
its offspring. Like (9), (10) provides information about counterfactual causal processes
59
. Such a 
negative causal statement presents the real situation as exceptional with respect to a normal 
situation
60
 where the expression of the fosB gene leads to normal maternal care. The causal 
process leading to the effect (the child’s accident or the offspring’s death) is in some sense 
abnormal. The father’s behaviour is abnormal with respect to moral obligation, the mouse’s 
behaviour is abnormal both in a statistical sense and in the sense of adaptation or fitness.  
 
9. Conclusion 
 
The contemporary philosophical debate on causation has split in several independent 
research traditions, and many philosophers have abandoned the ambition of constructing a unified 
theory that yields the correct result in all cases. One reason for the failure to reach a consensus on 
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the role of the cause or the effect. 
 27 
the analysis of causation is that there are two ways in which one may conceive of the aim of a 
philosophical theory of causation. Either the aim is to produce, by pure conceptual analysis, a 
systematic account of common sense intuitions, which may have to be corrected at some points to 
achieve coherence. Or the task is to find out what causation is in the real world. On the former 
conception, scientific knowledge is irrelevant; on the latter, agreement with science is not only a 
fundamental criterion of adequacy but ranks higher than agreement with intuition. I have argued 
for adopting the latter view. 
We have seen that intuitions themselves fall in two categories: Some of them assimilate 
causation to nomic dependence, i.e. dependence according to laws of nature; others assimilate 
causation to a mechanical link between cause and effect. Furthermore, there are two types of 
causal statements, which can be distinguished according to linguistic criteria. Eventive causal 
statements express a relation between two events, which are referred to by nouns or perfect 
gerunds; factive causal statements express a relation of causal responsibility between two facts, 
which are referred to by imperfect gerunds or other expressions of a propositional type. 
I have suggested an analysis of the causal relation that is in agreement with science, while 
at the same time respecting as far as possible the structure of common sense intuitions, which we 
have extracted from the analysis of causal statements and of the inference relations between 
them. I have suggested that an eventive causal statement is made true by a relation of transference 
between two events. This relation between events is part, but only part, of what makes true 
factive causal statements: The fact that c’s being F is causally responsible for e’s being H is made 
true by a complex relation consisting of 1) a transmission relation between the events c and e and 
2) a relation of nomic dependency between their properties F and H. I have defended this two-
fold analysis against arguments denying either facts or events the status of relata of causation. In 
particular, causal statements in which the expression referring to the cause or the effect has a 
negative form are often used to refute either the thesis that causation relates events or the thesis 
that causation between events requires transference. We have found that some of these statements 
are causal only in a derivative sense: they do not directly bear on a causal relation but provide 
counterfactual information about “normal” causal processes, where normality may be understood 
in terms of statistical average, biological fitness or morality
61
. 
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